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An Analysis of the Relationship Between Employment and Crime
Abstract
The relationship between aggregate unemployment rates and the incidence of crime has been frequently
analyzed (Cantor and Land, 1985; Bennett, 1991; Bushway, 2011). However, the result of this analysis has
been inconsistent. This discrepancy could be related to the inconsistent application of both economic
and sociological theory, as well as several methodological issues with previous research and literature
(Bennett, 1991). Becker’s 1968 paper describes crime as an individual decision made based on potential
loss and gain. However, many prior analyses examine aggregate data, masking changes in individuals’
situations behind aggregate numbers.
The importance of predicting crime for law enforcement and public policy can have a large significance
and magnitude on informed decisions. This can both reduce the cost of law enforcement and increase
the efficiency of anti-crime measures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The
relationship
between
aggregate
unemployment rates and the incidence of crime has
been frequently analyzed (Cantor and Land, 1985;
Bennett, 1991; Bushway, 2011). However, the result
of this analysis has been inconsistent. This discrepancy
could be related to the inconsistent application of
both economic and sociological theory, as well as
several methodological issues with previous research
and literature (Bennett, 1991). Becker’s 1968 paper
describes crime as an individual decision made based
on potential loss and gain. However, many prior analyses
examine aggregate data, masking changes in individuals’
situations behind aggregate numbers.
The importance of predicting crime for
law enforcement and public policy can have a large
significance and magnitude on informed decisions.
This can both reduce the cost of law enforcement and
increase the efficiency of anti-crime measures.
Potential criminals include their own situations
in their decision-making processes. In order to examine
how changes in situation affect changes in crime rates,
it is necessary to look at time series data to see the
subject’s response to changes.The longitudinal nature of
time series analysis also allows for comparison between
individuals. As a result, it is possible to make general
statements about responses to economic conditions.
NLSY97 data was examined to see whether
employment variables predict crime, with employment
represented by both income and the number of weeks
worked.Theory predicts that there are lagged effects of
employment on crime, which is why both lagged and
unlagged cases are examined. In order to validate the
assumption that changes in employment cause changes
in crime, rather than the other way around, the impact
of lagged crime on employment variables is also tested.
Employment is found to have a significant effect on

crime, although the theory fails to explain the lagged
effects of employment measures.
II. THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW
Many of the economic theories of criminal
activity draw from Becker’s 1968 paper, analyzing crime
as the result of rational choice. In his model, individuals
consider the expected benefit of crime, taking into
account the chance of success and the possible
monetary gain. If the expected benefit is greater than
the expected cost, which takes into account the chance
of failure and the cost of being punished, the individual
will commit a crime.
The expected benefit of crime depends on a
variety of factors. For crimes such as theft or burglary,
there is usually a clear monetary gain. However, the utility
gained from many types of violent crime, including rape
and murder, is usually not measurable. The expected
benefit of crime should also depend on income and
wealth; money has diminishing marginal effects on
utility, so people with higher wealth or income benefit
comparatively less from the same amount of capital.
The costs of crime offer a more direct
relationship between employment status and crime. In
general, the cost of crime is its punishment and depends
on the chance of being caught. The costs include any
fines for the crime and the opportunity cost incurred
by imprisonment. While in jail, a person cannot earn
the wages they would have earned if not in jail. There
may also be a loss in future wages. With a conviction
on record, it is harder to find higher paying jobs, which
means that past crimes can lead to lost wages well
into the future (Barak, 2009). Often included in other
studies is a measurement of the utility gained by being
honest or the cost of being dishonest. Many individuals
associate immorality with crime, and incur a “moral
cost” by committing a crime (Bourguignon, 2003).
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If unemployed, a person earns no wages, and so
loses no wages if in jail. This decreases the opportunity
cost of committing crime. Additionally, if a person’s
wealth decreases while unemployed, the same financial
benefit from a crime will have greater relative value.
Both effects lead to a higher chance of committing
crime.
Cohen and Felson (1979) predict additional
effects on crime from unemployment. They base
their theory around the idea that individuals tend to
fall into routines. According to them, individuals who
have fallen into routines while employed tend to stay
in their routines immediately after losing employment.
According to the routine activities theory, routines take
a certain amount of time to change. Instead of changing
their habits, Cohen and Felson claim that they the
recently unemployed will tend to draw on savings for a
short period of time to perpetuate their old routines
while first unemployed, without changing their behavior.
If conditions while unemployed are favorable for
committing crimes, individuals will commit crimes only
after taking time to break routines. Routine activities
theory thus suggests that there is a lagged effect of
unemployment on crime.
Christenson and Thornberry (1984) point out
that it is important to also consider reciprocal effects.
As mentioned above, committing a crime can make it
more difficult to procure employment in the future.This
not only increases the expected cost of current crime,
decreasing crime rates, but also leads to lagged effects
of crime on employment. Without testing for reciprocal
effects, conclusions assuming the changes in crime could
occur before changes in employment are invalid.
Theory predicts that both the number of
weeks worked and income should correlate negatively
to the probability that an individual commits a crime.
Routine activities theory predicts that this correlation
should be lagged. It is important to separately test for
reciprocal effects, as they influence the validity of the
forward relationship between employment measures
and crime.
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL
By using longitudinal data, we can account
for each individual’s characteristics by looking at the
likelihood of committing a crime changes over time.The
NLSY97 has longitudinal data for a many individuals that
include self-reported crimes and information about
employment. In order to simplify the analysis, only three
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types of crime are examined: destruction of property,
theft both above and below 50 dollars, and assault. The
survey question about assault focuses on fights, which
are more likely to offer a financial benefit than other
types of violent crime, such as murder or rape. As Land
(1985) finds, purely violent crimes such as murder
or rape respond differently to changes in economic
variables than other types of crime, partly because
these crimes usually offer a psychological benefit, rather
than a financial one. As a result, no other violent crimes
are analyzed.
Self-reported crime data tends to underestimate
the number of crimes committed (Mosher, et. al, 2002).
Minor offenses are particularly liable to being underreported; the inclusion of thefts below 50 dollars
could skew the data. This problem is difficult to avoid
for longitudinal data, as surveys rely on self-reported
information.
When analyzing the chance of an individual
committing a crime based on their current economic
situation, the total number of crimes isn’t as relevant
as whether or not a crime was committed at all. If
conditions make crime favorable, individuals should
commit crimes as long as they continue to offer a net
benefit. As a result, we look solely at whether or not
an individual committed a crime in the survey year.
This leads to a binary dependent variable. Although
subjects tend to underestimate the number of crimes
committed, they are more likely to accurately answer
binary questions about crime (Mosher, et. al, 2002).
Income per week is included to take into
account the potential opportunity cost of time in
prison, as well as the lower relative benefit from
committing crimes. Both effects should lead to a negative
correlation between income and crime. The amount
of employment is measured by the number of weeks
worked each year. This doesn’t discriminate between
full-time and part-time workers. However, the amount
of work per week is reflected in weekly income. These
variables collectively represent employment.
Several other variables can also impact crime
rates and are important to control for. As many authors
have shown (Shelley, 1981), age has a strong negative
impact on crime rates, an effect that is separate from
correlations between age and other variables. Because
age is known to have non-linear effects on crime (Shelley,
1981), age squared is included as well. Education is
also measured. The subject’s highest degree is used to
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measure education, even if the survey year is before the
subject obtained the degree. In these cases, the highest
degree variable serves as a proxy for educational
achievement, ranging from a high school education to a
PhD, omitting the case of no high school or high school
equivalent degree.
Because the dependent variable is a binary
variable, a logistic regression model is used. The
relationship is assumed to be multiplicative, as in
Equation 1.
P = Emp*Income*ß
Here, P represents the odds of an individual
committing a crime, Emp is the number of weeks
employed and Income is income per week. The
variable ß represents the product of other factors.
Taking the logarithm, the following regression equation
is created, Equation 2.
ln P = a _0+ a_1 ln Emp+ a_2 ln Income+ a_3 Age
+ a_4 Age^2+ a_4 Female+ ∑i yk HighestDegreei
Here, the ak represent the coefficients for the different
variables. The ykrepresents the coefficients for the
collection of education dummy variables Highest
Degreei.
The logarithmic nature of Equation 2 makes
the equation focus on the multiplicative assumption in
Equation 1, which is equivalent to the assumption that
the equation is linear in the proportional changes of the
variables. This suggests that Equation 2 measures the
individuals’ responses to changes in variables. As a result,
dummy variables are unnecessary for each individual in
Equation 2.
Some survey questions are phrased in terms of
the calendar year before the interview, while others are
based on the duration since the last interview. Subjects
who missed survey years are likely to report data
with different scopes, making the data meaningless. In
order to avoid these errors, all missing years and cases
following missing years are excluded from the analysis.
In order to measure the lagged effect of
employment variables on crime, another regression
is run. According to the routine activities theory
mentioned above, there should be a lagged effect of
income and weeks worked on crime. As Thornberry and
Christenson mention (1984), there are also reciprocal

effects to consider. However, using unlagged crime rate
variables to test such effects is mathematically a rearrangement of the regression in Equation 2. In order
to measure the reciprocal effects, regressions are run
to measure the impact of crime on future economic
variables by lagging the crime variable. Equation 3
shows the regression equation for the number of weeks
worked.
WeeksWorked=[(a+ß)]_0 LagCrimeInYear+ß_1
Age+ß_2 Age^2+ß_3 Income+
ß_4 Gender+ ∑_iy_i HighestDegree_i+ß_5
LagWeeksWorked
These regressions are simple linear regressions. They
are run for both the length of employment and weekly
income. The other variables are included for the same
reason as in the first set of regressions. Income and
WeeksWorked are lagged in their own regressions, and
unlagged in the others. Including a lagged dependent
variable as an independent variable for time-series
data reduces autocorrelation. Along with variables like
education and age, income can be seen as a measure
of productivity, which influences the length an individual,
is hired. If productivity is taken to explain the length of
employment, then the length of employment cannot be
used in the regression for productivity, as it gives no new
information. Equation 4 shows the income regression.
Income=[(a+ß)]_0 LagCrimeInYear+ß_1 Age+ß_2
Age^2+ß_3 Gender+
∑_i y_i HighestDegree_i+ß_4 LagIncome
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics for the data.The
ages range from 13 to 30, with every subject within a
couple years of the same age. For both WeeksWorked
and income earned, the means are decreased by the
number of cases with no reported employment.
IV. RESULTS
Table 2 presents the results of the unlagged
crime regression. The coefficients are the log odds
ratios for each independent variable. As expected, both
the number of weeks worked and employment show
a significant negative relationship with the likelihood of
committing a crime. Because the regression is run in log
terms, the magnitudes of the coefficients represent the
powers of the terms multiplied. More importantly, the
significance of the coefficients points to a multiplicative
relationship between these independent variables
and crime rates. To interpret the log odds ratio, the
coefficient is exponentiated, yielding the odds ratio,
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which is then converted to a probability.
The odds ratio for number of WeeksWorked
means that for an increase by a factor of e in the number
of weeks worked, the odds of committing a crime
decrease by 10 percent, meaning that the individual
is 2.4 percent less likely to commit a crime. Similarly,
when income increases by a factor of e, the individual’s
chance of committing a crime decreases by around
2.2 percent compared to even odds. This comparison
to even odds represents the exponentiation of the
odds ratio mentioned earlier. However, the change
in probability for a given change in odds is nonlinear,
and so the comparison to even odds serves only as an
illustrative tool.
Because there is a finite number of weeks
in a year, there is a limit to how low weeks worked
can decrease the odds ratio for committing a crime.
Compared to an identical individual with no employment
in a year, an individual with 52 weeks worked will be
around 10 percent less likely to commit a crime. Given
the cost required to employ someone throughout the
year, this is a relatively small decrease in crime rates.
The education dummy variables are generally
as expected, with more education leading to lower
crime, with two exceptions. The variables range from a
GED, the first case, to a professional degree, the seventh
case, which omits the case of no GED and no high
school. Subjects with a PhD and subjects with a GED
show a higher chance of committing a crime than those
without degrees, which contradicts the hypothesis that
education leads to higher crime.The result for doctorates
is small and very insignificant, which makes sense given
that there are very few individuals in the study with a
highest degree of a PhD. However, the results for GEDs
are significant to the .05 level. There are many possible
explanations for this: individuals who took the time to
get a GED could be the same individuals who are more
willing to take risks for economic gain, for instance. For
the other education levels, the results make sense: as
education level rises, the chance of committing crime
drops.
The age results also support Shelley’s empirical
findings (1981). As discussed above, age should have
a negative, but diminishing, effect on crime rates. The
results show a strong negative impact of age on crime;
however, age squared shows a slight, but significant,
positive correlation with the chance of committing
crime. This nonlinear term, although small, significantly
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reduces the marginal effect of age for the ranges of ages
in the study. Theoretically, the turning point at which the
nonlinear effects dominate and higher age leads to more
crime is around 26 with the data given. However, this is
unreliable simply because of the limited age range of the
study. With a highest age of 30, there are too few points
above the age of 26 to make a claim about a turning
point; however, it is notable that a turning point was
seen at all, and gives opportunity for further analysis
with larger data sets.
Gender also has a significant coefficient, showing
that women are less likely to commit crimes. Compared
to even odds, the probability of committing a crime
decreases by more than .13 for women, an effect that
supports other criminological research (Shelley, 1981).
Table 3 contains the regression results for the
model with only lagged employment variables included.
Most of the coefficients are similar to those obtained
from the first regression. However, the lagged income
and lagged number of WeeksWorked variables both
correlate positively to crime. As mentioned by Shelley
(1981) and Cohen and Felson (1979), this could be
because individuals compare their current position to
past positions, and once an individual has been more
successful, they are willing to take greater risks to
continue their success.
Table 4 summarizes the regression with both
the lagged and non-lagged cases. The same patterns
seen earlier are seen here as well. The impact of age on
crime is much larger, while the coefficient for gender is
smaller.
Compared to the first and second regressions,
the coefficients for the employment variables are greater
in magnitude.This can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
The positive sign of the lagged variables suggests that to
a certain extent, the amount that an individual’s income
or employment has improved within a year plays a role
in determining when to commit crime.
The results for the reciprocal effects are
summarized in Tables 5 and 6. For the regression with
only lagged crime rate, we see that most coefficients
have the expected sign. As expected, as age increases the
number of weeks worked increases as well. Diminishing
returns for age suggest that age squared should reduce
the impact of age, with a coefficient with the opposite
sign. Age squared here has a slight but significant negative
effect, as expected. The education dummy variables all
have positive effects, but interestingly, higher education
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has less of a positive impact than an associate degree
or junior college.
As can be seen, lagged crime rates have a
negative impact on the number of weeks worked.
However, this effect is both small, and statistically
insignificant. This suggests that crime does not have a
strong lagged effect on employment.
Table 6 summarizes the results for the income
regression. For income per week, crime has an even
smaller, statistically insignificant effect. The same is true
for unlagged crime: the effect is relatively small and
insignificant. This suggests that the result obtained by
Thornberry needs to be revisited, as the effects of
crime on employment and wages are small.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As expected, employment correlates negatively
to crime. Assuming that this relationship is a causal
relationship, this suggests that increasing employment
leads to lower crime rates. Because the relationship is
logarithmic, the effect has diminishing marginal returns,
meaning that increasing employment is most effective
for individuals who are unemployed or have little
employment. The same is true for income.
The results support Becker’s rational choice
theory. However, for the lagged variables, the effect is
positive, and fails to show evidence for routine activities
theory, which claims that Becker’s predicted negative
effect would be lagged. The positive effect observed is
statistically significant. Moreover, the effect’s magnitude
increases when the unlagged variables are included as
well, suggesting that, to a certain degree, the difference
between current and past employment status is an
important determinant of crime. This could be because
of the importance of comparison for individuals: the
routine activities theory describes a necessary lag in
time for routines to be broken, but, rather than the
change of routine, the change in lifestyle necessitated by
changes in employment may be more relevant.
For the reciprocal effects described by
Thornberry (1984), the results are mixed.The effects of
crime on the number of weeks worked and on weekly
income are both small and statistically insignificant. This
suggests that the relationship is more complex than the
description of either routine activities theory or the
reciprocal effect theory.
Shelley (1981) mentions that given the

complexity of the causes of crime, it is impossible to
come up with coherent prediction. However, Becker’s
rational choice theory remains well supported by the
evidence, which justifies its continued use (Levitt and
Miles, 2006) in analyzing crime.
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VII. APPENDIX

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Minimum
AnyCrimesinYear
0
WeeksWorked
0
IncomePerWeek
0.00
HighestDegree
0
Gender
1

Maximum
1
60
44091.00
7
2

Mean
.19
24.84
223.6962
2.21
1.47

Std. Deviation
.389
21.035
814.42017
1.375
.499

Table 2: Unlagged Employment
B
S.E.
Wald
df
Sig.
Exp(B)
LnWeeksWorked
-.159
.025
39.649
1
.000
.853
LnIncomePerWeek
-.063
.016
14.608
1
.000
.939
HighestDegree
140.047
7
.000
HighestDegree(1)
.196
.075
6.735
1
.009
1.216
HighestDegree(2)
-.165
.065
6.344
1
.012
.848
HighestDegree(3)
-.180
.089
4.065
1
.044
.835
HighestDegree(4)
-.468
.073
41.508
1
.000
.626
HighestDegree(5)
-.540
.117
21.127
1
.000
.583
HighestDegree(6)
.059
.389
.023
1
.879
1.061
HighestDegree(7)
-.728
.229
10.089
1
.001
.483
Age
-.744
.062
144.518
1
.000
.475
Gender(1)
-.470
.038
156.780
1
.000
.625
AgeSquared
.014
.001
94.939
1
.000
1.014
CrimeLastYear
1.414
.038
1361.635
1
.000
4.111
Constant
8.400
.615
186.763
1
.000
4445.093
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LnWeeksWorked, LnIncomePerWeek, HighestDegree, Age, Gender,
AgeSquared, CrimesLastYear.
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Table 3: Lagged Employment
B
S.E.
Wald
df
Sig.
Exp(B)
LagLnWeeksWorked
.180
.023
60.543
1
.000
1.198
LagLnIncomePerWeek
.213
.013
254.126
1
.000
1.237
HighestDegree
154.125
7
.000
HighestDegree(1)
.141
.075
3.559
1
.059
1.151
HighestDegree(2)
-.284
.064
19.885
1
.000
.753
HighestDegree(3)
-.365
.090
16.555
1
.000
.694
HighestDegree(4)
-.522
.072
53.331
1
.000
.593
HighestDegree(5)
-.737
.121
37.354
1
.000
.478
HighestDegree(6)
-.355
.475
.559
1
.455
.701
HighestDegree(7)
-.638
.221
8.365
1
.004
.528
Age
-1.084
.054
403.658
1
.000
.338
Gender(1)
-.373
.038
97.190
1
.000
.689
AgeSquared
.020
.001
228.190
1
.000
1.020
CrimeLastYear
1.688
.043
1561.462
1
.000
5.411
Constant
10.326
.578
319.232
1
.000
30524.587
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LagLnWeeksWorked, LagLnIncomePerWeek, HighestDegree, Age,
Gender, AgeSquared, CrimeLastYear.
Table 4: Unlagged and Lagged Employment
B
S.E.
Wald
df
Sig.
Exp(B)
LagLnWeeeksWorked
.259
.036
52.845
1
.000
1.296
LagLnIncomePerWeek
.261
.020
173.035
1
.000
1.298
LnWeeksWorked
-.300
.039
60.439
1
.000
.741
LnIncomePerWeek
-.186
.025
53.755
1
.000
.830
HighestDegree
85.394
7
.000
HighestDegree(1)
.002
.106
.000
1
.985
1.002
HighestDegree(2)
-.377
.091
17.180
1
.000
.686
HighestDegree(3)
-.496
.122
16.540
1
.000
.609
HighestDegree(4)
-.602
.099
36.586
1
.000
.548
HighestDegree(5)
-.755
.156
23.561
1
.000
.470
HighestDegree(6)
-.587
.578
1.031
1
.310
.556
HighestDegree(7)
-1.136
.311
13.325
1
.000
.321
Age
-.970
.088
121.764
1
.000
.379
Gender(1)
-.355
.051
48.502
1
.000
.701
AgeSquared
.018
.002
81.550
1
.000
1.018
CrimeLastYear
1.742
.053
1096.264
1
.000
5.710
Constant
10.327
.904
130.507
1
.000
30551.427
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: LagLnWeeksWorked, LagLnIncomePerWeek, LnWeeksWorked, LnIncomePerWeek, HighestDegree, Age, Gender, AgeSquared, CrimeLastYear.
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Table 5
Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
1
(Constant)
-69.281
2.500
CrimeLastYear
-.257
.190
AgeSquared
-.148
.005
IncomePerWeek
-.003
.000
Age
7.763
.233
KEY!SEX(SYMBOL)1997
-.288
.145
GED
1.218
.297
High School
4.826
.248
Associate/Junior College
6.348
.355
Bachelor’s
4.719
.277
Master’s
4.110
.441
PhD
2.060
1.923
Professional Degree
1.028
.844
LagWeeksWorked
.175
.003
a. Dependent Variable: Weeks Worked
Table 6
Model

1

(Constant)
CrimeLastYear
AgeSquared
WeeksWorked
Age
KEY!SEX(SYMBOL)1997
GED
High School
Associate/Junior College
Bachelor’s
Master’s
PhD
Professional Degree
LagIncomePerWeek
a. Dependent Variable: IncomePerWeek

100

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
-837.039
146.285
-2.329
11.394
-.084
.306
-8.097
.266
68.495
13.539
-68.853
8.368
46.472
17.255
106.984
14.594
156.113
20.653
99.585
16.192
68.071
25.593
91.678
107.206
16.854
49.480
.047
.005

-.006
-1.325
-.140
1.593
-.008
.024
.142
.094
.112
.045
.004
.005
.278

t
-27.715
-1.351
-27.898
-32.567
33.386
-1.992
4.106
19.422
17.875
17.064
9.322
1.072
1.218
62.440

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.001
-.015
-.157
.282
-.041
.019
.064
.047
.048
.015
.004
.002
.043
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t
-5.722
-.204
-.273
-30.497
5.059
-8.228
2.693
7.331
7.559
6.150
2.660
.855
.341
8.592

Sig.
.000
.177
.000
.000
.000
.046
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.284
.223
.000

Sig.
.000
.838
.785
.000
.000
.000
.007
.000
.000
.000
.008
.392
.733
.000

